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We conduct a prisoner’s dilemma experiment with a punishment/reward 
stage, where punishments and rewards are risky. This is compared with a 
risk free treatment. We find that subjects do not change their behavior in 
the face of risky outcomes. Additionally, we measure risk attitude and 
the emotions of subjects. While we find a strong influence of emotions, 
individual risk aversion has no effect on the decision to punish or 
reward. This is good news for lab experiments who abstract from risky 
outcomes. From the perspective of social preferences, our results provide 
evidence for risk neutral inclusion of other player’s payoffs in the 
decisionmaker’s utility function. 
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Imagine two researches working on a joint project. Both can work hard or free-ride on 
the work of the other researcher. For a certain set of outcomes, they are stuck in a prisoner’s 
dilemma. The researchers are aware that their action will eventually be revealed to their co-
author, so that the opportunity for punishment or reward arises. What could a reward look 
like? For example, one could reward the other by drafting an excellent letter of 
recommendation. Punishment could take the form of stopping all further cooperation. 
However, it is unclear what effect the reward and punishment will have on the co-author. If 
the punished researcher has plenty of other potential co-authors, losing one might not be so 
harsh, but if the number of potential co-authors is small, losing one will hurt a lot. Similarly, a 
letter of recommendation can be the decisive advantage in a close race for a job or to obtain 
tenure or be almost meaningless if other factors already decided the outcome. Since the 
person who punishes or rewards does not necessarily know the situation the other is in, the 
decision to punish or reward is made under risk. We conduct an experiment to test whether 
more risk in the punishment and reward outcomes influences the decision whether to 
punish/reward or not. 
Social dilemma situations like the prisoner’s dilemma have been extensively studied in 
the economics literature for a long time (see Roth (1988) for an overview). Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) show that the incentive to defect in a social dilemma can be counteracted by 
introducing a second stage which allows for a punishment. Despite the punishment being 
costly, many subjects use that opportunity to deter defection. Initially, the effect on 
cooperation is small, but the contributions to a public project increase over time in a repeated 
game. A considerable amount of literature follows this paper and extends the result to non-
pecuniary sanctions (Masclet et al. (2003); Noussair and Tucker (2005), explore the 
effectiveness of punishment (Nikiforakis and Normann (2005)), and the price of punishment 
(Anderson and Putterman (2006), Carpenter (2005)). These experiments (and all other 
experiments that we are aware of) abstracts from reality by modeling the second stage without 
risk. Yet subjects are, in general, not risk-neutral (Cox et al. (1988), Holt and Laury (2002)). 
That is, the different risk structure present in the lab experiments could potentially lead to 
outcomes which are different from behavior in the real world.1 Our treatments Risk and 
Baseline address this issue. We test the hypothesis that more risk-averse subjects 
punish/reward less in the presence of more risky outcomes. While the expected punishment 
and reward is the same in both cases, the result of punishment and reward is risky in the Risk 
treatment, whereas no risk is present in the Baseline. Baseline thus resembles previous 
experimental studies; Risk connects them to the outside-the-lab world. We find that the 
decisions to punish and reward are not statistically significantly different in the two 
treatments. We conclude that the added risk does not change subjects’ behavior. 
Subjects’ risk attitude is elicited at an individual level, allowing us to test whether 
subjects who are more risk-averse use less punishment or reward in the Risk treatment 
compared to those subjects who are risk-loving. Again, we find no evidence for an influence 
of risk: the risk-averse subjects punish and reward just as much as the risk-loving ones do. 
Our research contributes to the discussion on other-regarding behavior. In particular, the 
experiment sheds light on the way the payoff of other players enters one’s own utility 
function. One of the earliest proposed theories of social preferences is Andreoni’s (1990) 
warm glow. Our results on risk are in line with this theory where the utility from giving to 
others is derived from the act of giving itself. Risk that affects the payoff of the other player 
would be disregarded. For theories which incorporate the payoff of others directly (Levine 
(1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)), our results say that risk for 
the other person is ignored by subjects, even if they are risk-averse. That is, the term 
                                                 
1 Of course lab experiments are, by construction, simplifications of the real world. However it is important to 
keep in mind these differences and whenever possible test their influence, since despite being simplifications, lab 
experiments are often (directly or indirectly) used to draw inferences towards real world behavior. 
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describing the other’s payoff enters risk-neutrally, even when the own payoff term is risk-
averse. 
Another potential answer to the apparent puzzle are emotions. Since punishment is 
costly, it is usually not rational to punish in one-shot experiments. A very plausible 
explanation why people still punish is that they are driven by emotions.2 A number of recent 
experimental studies provide evidence that emotions influence the reciprocal decisions (e.g., 
Bosman and van Winden (2002), Ben-Shakhar et al. (2004), Bosman et al. (2005)). Coricelli 
(2005) reports on an experiment where emotions are related to the amount of 
punishment/reward done by subjects. Connecting to our research, Hsu et al. (2005) show that 
emotions are processed in the same area of the brain which is also activated when subjects are 
faced with uncertain or risky choices. This raises the question whether emotions and risk 
interact with each other and if so, how. LeDoux (1996) suggests that emotions act as a short 
cut to override the more lengthy rational decision process in situations where procrastination 
is harmful. We elicit the emotions of our subjects to test whether emotions are related to 
punishment and reward in the prisoner’s dilemma and whether there is an influence from risk 
attitude to emotions. There are a number of theories where the anticipation of future feelings 
influences the behavior, such as anxiety (Caplin and Leahy (2001), Wu (1999)), 
disappointment (Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986)), and regret (Bell (1982), Loomes 
and Sugden (1982)). In our paper we do not measure the anticipated emotions, rather, we ask 
the subjects about the experienced emotions after the decision has been made. 
The importance of emotions when making risky decisions has been explored by Bosman 
and van Winden (2005) and Hopfensitz and van Winden (2006). These papers focus on the 
influence of global risk on investment decisions and the timing of its resolution. Our study 
can be viewed as a bridge between this strand of literature and the literature on emotions-
driven reciprocity. 
Next we present the experimental setup and our results, followed by a short discussion. 
Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
1. Experimental Setup 
Our experiment was conducted as a classroom experiment at the University of 
Heidelberg in November 2006. It was run manually under single blind social distance 
protocol. All treatments took place during one session that lasted approximately an hour. It 
included the initial instructional period but not the payment of subjects. The subjects were 
paid their experimental earnings during the break after the lecture that followed the 
experiment. A total of 125 undergraduates, with economics as primary or secondary field, 
participated in our two treatments – Baseline and Risk. The students were in the first weeks of 
their studies, without previous exposure to experimental economics or game theory. 
The experiment consists of four parts: In parts 1 and 2 the prisoner’s dilemma with 
subsequent punishment/reward stage which includes the treatment difference is played; part 3 
consists of an emotions elicitation questionnaire; part 4 elicits the risk attitude using Holt and 
Laury (2002) method. At the end subjects fill out a general questionnaire. 
1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma with punishment and reward stage 
Table 1: Prisoner's dilemma payoffs 
In parts 1 and 2 of the experiments, subjects are 
grouped in anonymous pairs and simultaneously play a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. The game payoffs are 
presented in Table 1. The row player chooses Top 
                                                 
2 See Loewenstein (2005) for an overview of how emotions are related to decision making. 
 Left Right
Top 8,8 0,10 
Bottom 10,0 2,2 
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(cooperation) or Bottom (defection), while the column player chooses Left (cooperation) or 
Right (defection). Payoffs are denoted in euros. After being notified of the results of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, subjects could engage in costly punishment or reward of their partner. 
Subjects with a partner who cooperated (i.e., who chose Top, respectively Left) could 
only decide whether to reward, subjects with a partner who did not cooperate (i.e., who chose 
Bottom, respectively Right) could either reward or punish.3 Subjects could punish/reward by 
spending between zero and five euros on assigning punishment or reward points. In our 
Baseline treatment, each assigned point decreases/increases the other player’s payoff by one 
euro with certainty. In the Risk treatment, each assigned point decreases/increases the other 
player’s payoff by two euros. However, the punishment/reward is only carried out with a 
probability of 0.5. Therefore, the expected punishment/reward are the same in both 
treatments. Note that the costs of assigning a point are incurred by the subject irrespective of 
the outcome of the probability draw. 
In the classical solution for self-regarding preferences, no punishment/reward will ever 
be observed because it is costly, and players will always choose defect in both Baseline and 
Risk treatments. 
 
1.2 Emotion elicitation 
After completing the punishment/reward stage, subject’s received the instructions for the 
further parts of the experiment. In the emotion elicitation questionnaire, subjects were asked 
to think back at the moment when they were notified of their partner’s decision in the 
prisoner’s dilemma and to report the level of 10 emotions (anger, appreciation, 
disappointment, envy, gratitude, happiness, hate, regret, shame, surprise) they felt on a scale 
from 0 to 5. One may wonder what is the link between what people really feel and what they 
report to be feeling and also whether such self reporting are appropriate to elicit emotions. 
Yet, self-reports according to Robinson and Clore (2002) are “the most common and 
potentially the best way to measure a person’s emotional experience”. Indeed, self-report 
measures have been used in numerous other studies dealing with emotions (Charness and 
Grosskopf (2001), van Winden (2001), Bosman and van Winden (2002), Bosman and Riedl 
(2004), Bosman et al. (2005), Hopfensitz and van Winden (2006) and others). Ben-Shakhar et 
al. (2004) found the self-reported measures of emotions to be highly correlated with 
physiological measures using skin conductance.  
 
1.3 Risk attitude elicitation 
In part 4 of the experiments we use the Holt and Laury (2002) method to measure our 
subjects’ risk attitudes. That is, subjects are repeatedly offered the choice between two 
lotteries, one involving higher risk than the other. From the subjects’ choices between ten 
lottery pairs it is possible to calculate their individual risk aversion parameter. For further 
details, see Holt and Laury (2002). 
 
1.4 General Questionnaire 
Finally, our subjects completed a short questionnaire asking for their year of birth, 
gender, field of studies, semester at university, and place of birth. Answering these questions 
was not required for payment. 
 
                                                 
3 We choose to disallow punishment of cooperators to prevent subjects from making losses in the overall 
experiment. 
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The sequence of events in a session was the following.  (i) Upon entering the lecture hall 
subjects were randomly seated in one of the four designated rows. Once these rows were 
filled up the additional subjects were seated into next four rows. Subjects of the same type for 
a given treatment (e.g. column player in the Risk treatment) were sitting in the same row.  (ii) 
The neutrally framed instructions (in German) and decision forms for part 1 and 2 were 
handed out. All sheets indicated subjects’ ID number.  (iii) The subjects made their decisions 
for part 1.  (iv) The experimenters collected the decisions forms, transferred the decision 
information to their counterparts’ decision forms and returned them to subjects. This 
prevented the exchange of superfluous information and aided in maintaining the anonymity of 
individual decisions.  (v) After learning the decision of the paired player the subjects made 
their decisions regarding rewards and punishment on the decision form 2.  (vi) The 
experimenters collected the decision sheets for parts 1 and 2.   
(vii) The instructions, decision forms for parts 3 and 4, and general questionnaires were 
handed out, filled out by subjects, and collected by the experimenters, one at a time. Subjects 
were informed beforehand that there would be additional individual tasks after the prisoner’s 
dilemma game with reward/punishment, but not about the nature of these tasks.  (vii) At the 
end of the session the experimenters randomly selected 20 subjects (10 prisoner’s dilemma 
pairs) for payment for parts 1 through 3 and additional 20 subjects for part 4 (selected without 
replacement). (viii) Lecture continued. (ix) After the lecture the randomly selected subjects 
were paid privately in cash. Each subject selected for payment for the first two parts received 
the following amount: an endowment of 5 Euro plus the earnings in the prisoner’s dilemma 
plus/minus the reward/punishment minus the reward/punishment costs plus a fixed sum of 8 
Euro for completing the emotions elicitation part.4 Each subject selected for payment for part 
4 was paid for one randomly chosen lottery from the risk attitude questionnaire. All risky 
decisions and lotteries were resolved by flipping a coin/rolling a 10-sided die in front of the 
subjects at the time of payment.5 
 
2. Results 
Table 2: Prisoner's dilemma choices 
In our Baseline treatment, almost half of 
the subjects chose to defect on their partner in 
the prisoner’s dilemma situation. The fraction 
of subjects who defected is smaller when the 
subsequent punishment/reward stage involves 
risky outcomes (see Table 2). However, this 
difference is not statistically significant.6 
Similarly, we find no significant difference in the level of punishment or rewards between the 
two treatments when looking at aggregated levels. 
 
                                                 
4 The subjects learned this only at the beginning of the part 3. Giving the fixed sum to the subjects was aimed to 
prevent them from making losses in the experiment. This could have been done by having a higher endowment 
up front. However, we wanted to keep the initial endowment relatively low in comparison to the payoffs decided 
by subjects’ actions in the prisoners’ dilemma and reward/punishment stages. 
5 A potential criticism is that because of random payment, all subjects are making decisions under risk, not just 
those in the Risk treatment. However, even with random payment, there is more risk in the Risk treatment 
compared to Baseline, thus Hypothesis 1 can be tested. An additional advantage of having random payments is 
that subject’s answers in the risk aversion questionnaire are less likely to be influenced by their achievements in 
parts 1 and 2. 
6 We conduct a two-sample test of proportions (Sincich, 1987) yielding a p-value of 0.2455 for the two-sided 
test. 
PD 
choices Cooperate Defect 
Baseline 32 (51.61%) 
30 
(48.39%) 
Risk 39 (61.9%) 
24 
(38.1%) 
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Table 3: Mean Punishment and Reward 
At the same time, we think it is more 
informative to look at subjects who are found 
to be in the same situation in both treatments. 
When asked whether to punish a defector, 
subjects who cooperated might decide 
differently from those who defected 
themselves. To address this issue, we split the 
data according to all four possible situations: Having played cooperation while the partner 
cooperated as well (Cooperation vs. Cooperator), having played cooperation while the partner 
defected (Cooperation vs. Defector) and similarly for subjects who played defection against 
the partner who cooperated (Defection vs. Cooperator) or  defected (Defection vs. Defector). 
Comparing subjects in the same situation across treatments shows no significant difference in 
the punishment/reward with a Mann-Whitney test at a 0.05 significance level. 
Our hypothesis asserts that subjects with higher risk aversion should punish and reward 
less in the treatment where the outcomes of the punishment/reward decision are risky. We use 
the risk attitude as measured in the third part of our experiment. Using the Holt and Laury 
method, the risk attitude is determined by the number of safe choices made while choosing 
between the safe and risky lottery. Never choosing the safe lottery (zero safe choices) 
corresponds to extremely risk-loving subjects. The higher the number of safe choices, the 
more risk-averse the subject is. Risk neutrality corresponds to choosing the safe lottery 
exactly four times.7 
Figure 1: Risk attitude 
 
                                                 
7 Definite statements about the risk attitude are only possible if the choices are monotonously ordered, that is 
when there is one lottery such that the subject always chooses the safe lottery for lower ranked lottery pairs and 
the riskier lottery for higher ranked lottery pairs. 79.5% of our subject display such monotonous choice behavior, 
we only use these subjects when making statements about risk attitudes. 
Mean Punishment Reward
Baseline -.4412 (1.35) 
1.3258 
(1.66) 
Risk -.5476 (1.29)  
1.0118 
(1.59)  
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The distribution of safe choices is shown in Figure 1. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z-test 
confirms that the random allocation of subjects to treatments yielded two subject groups with 
similar distributions of risk attitude (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z of 0.694, two-tailed). Overall, 
our subjects show considerable amount of risk aversion, while almost none are risk-loving. 
To test the research hypothesis, we compare the mean value of punishment and reward 
points for each group of risk attitude. Zero points mean that neither a punishment nor a reward 
was chosen. Subjects could not reward and punish at the same time. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, we do not find a lower mean value of punishment and reward among the risk-
averse subjects in the Risk treatment than in the Baseline. This is also shown in the correlation 
between the number of safe choices in the Risk treatment and the punishment and reward 
points, which is not significant (Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.084 with a one-tailed 
significance level of 0.275), where for the hypothesis to be true this correlation would have to 
be negative and significant.8 
Furthermore, we find no significant difference between the overall mean value of 
punishment and reward points between our two treatments with a Mann-Whitney test (two-
tailed significance level of 0.486). Thus we conclude that the hypothesis is rejected and that 
more risk does not lead to lower punishment and reward among risk-averse subjects. 
Figure 2: Mean value of punishment/reward  
 
 
The data show very clear results for the emotions part. In Table 4 the means for all 
emotions are listed, categorized by the action taken (if any). Anger, disappointment and regret 
are significantly higher for subjects who punished, while appreciation, happiness, gratitude 
and surprise9 are significantly higher for subjects who rewarded. 
                                                 
8 We also conduct a regression (see Table 5 in the appendix) including the variables gathered by our 
questionnaires. Since several emotions are strongly correlated with each other, we have to exclude some 
emotions because of multicolliniarity. There is no significant influence of the number of safe choices unto 
subjects’ punishment/reward decision. What has a strong influence is the fact whether cooperating subjects 
played against other cooperators or defectors. 
9 Unlike the other emotions, the effect of surprise on punishment and reward can be hypothesized in both 
directions: Subjects could either be positively or negatively surprised. Therefore we use a two-sided test for this 
emotion. 
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There is a clear relation between negative emotions felt at the moment of learning the 
partner’s action and later punishment. A similar relation exists between positive emotions and 
later reward. Since both punishments and rewards are costly in our experiment and the game 
is not repeated, doing either is never profit-maximizing. Our results thus indicate that 
emotions and their expression go hand in hand with actions which can lower own monetary 
payoffs. 
Furthermore, the level of emotions felt and their composition is not different for risk-
averse, risk-neutral or risk-loving subjects (compare Figure 3 in the appendix).10 
 
Table 4: Emotions 
Mean 
emotion/ Std. dev. 
Subjects who 
punished 
Subjects who 
neither punished nor 
rewarded 
Subjects who 
rewarded 
Regret* 2,58 (1,564) 1,59 (1,669) 1,55 (1,779)
Gratitude** 0,67 (1,155) 1,78 (1,689) 2,21 (1,515)
Disappointment** 2,25 (1,357) 1,44 (1,856) 0,89 (1,448)
Happiness** 0,50 (0,905) 1,82 (1,851) 2,33 (1,602)
Hate 0,58 (1,379) 0,46 (1,090) 0,21 (0,858)
Envy 0,42 (0,669) 0,60 (1,115) 0,34 (0,788)
Shame 0,09 (0,302) 0,32 (0,668) 0,57 (1,058)
Surprise* 1,75 (0,866) 2,53 (1,553) 2,81 (1,409)
Appreciation* 1,42 (1,379) 2,03 (1,849) 2,42 (1,318)
Anger* 0,75 (1,138) 0,51 (1,162) 0,34 (0,700)
*Difference between subjects who punished and subjects who rewarded significant at 0.05 level (one sided 
Mann-Whitney test, two-sided for surprise) 
** Difference between subjects who punished and subjects who rewarded significant at 0.01 level (one 
sided Mann-Whitney test) 
 
3. Discussion 
We conduct an experiment to test the influence of emotions and risk on the punishment 
and reward behavior of subjects. We find a strong connection between the emotions felt and 
action taken by our subjects, but no evidence that risk is a factor in that decision. There are 
several potential explanations for our findings. 
LeDoux (1996) and others11 argue that emotions override the decision process as a 
mechanism to induce fast decisions in dangerous situations, where procrastination would lead 
to negative outcomes of high magnitude. In that case, the fact that our subjects feel emotions 
would mean that their normal decision process, along with their normal risk attitude, is not 
utilized when making the decision about punishment and rewards. Although it is hard to 
imagine that being defected upon in a prisonner’s dilemma experiment is a life threatening 
situation, according to this explanation the presence of emotions eliminates the effects of risk 
attitude what is in line with our observations. 
Another explanation is given by Andreoni’s (1990) theory of warm glow (and a possible 
theory of “cold glow” for punishment). His theory states that the utility of the rewarding 
person (punisher) from influencing her partner’s payoff is solely derived from the fact that she 
gives up some of her own assets and not from the fact that something arrives at (is taken away 
                                                 
10 This is confirmed by performing the Kruskal-Wallis test, which finds no significant difference at a 0.793 
significance level. 
11 See Elster (1998) for a discussion. 
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from) her partner’s assets. Recall that in our setup, the risk influences the arrival, but not what 
is given up by the decision maker, to see that the warm glow is supported by the experimental 
data. 
On a different note, our subjects might derive their utility from influencing the utility of 
the other person and might see the risk as being incorporated into the partner’s utility. 
Combined with a belief of risk neutrality about the other person, this would also take away 
any difference between our treatments. Lastly, punishing and rewarding demands the complex 
capability of being able to empathize with the other person, to guess what the other person 
will feel in different situations. To be able to do so is a non-trivial accomplishment for the 
human brain. If the brain is only able to perform a certain number of tasks at a time, the use of 
this complex mechanism might crowd out other mechanisms, like the one used to assess risk. 
Subjects might only take the simple, risk neutral, average outcome into account because their 
brain is busy empathizing. 
The fact that we find no influence of risk on punishment and reward decisions increases 
the external validity of the experiments which are using certain punishment or reward. The 
risk structure of real world decisions often differs in that aspect, but our findings suggest that 
this might not be of importance when drawing conclusions from those experiments towards 
other settings. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 5: Tobit Regression 
Number of obs    =  95 
LR chi2(9)      =  19.08 
Prob > chi2   =  0.0246 
Pseudo R2       =  0.0453 
Log likelihood  =  -201.06248 
 
Action Coef. Std. Err. t P> | t | [95% Conf. Interval] 
Treatment .5508497 .4966894 1.11 0.271 -.4365362 1.538.236 
Hate -.2082991 .2445986 -0.85 0.397 -.6945451 .2779468 
Shame .5708588 .3014588 1.89 0.062 -.0284215 1.170.139 
Surprise .2712518 .1727736 1.57 0.120 -.0722108 .6147143 
Semester -.1381347 .1607481 -0.86 0.393 -.4576913 .1814219 
Sex -.3288138 .5563687 -0.59 0.556 -1.434.838 .7772105 
RA .0723561 .5581814 0.13 0.897 -1.037.272 1.181.984 
RAsq -.0061798 .0462163 -0.13 0.894 -.0980548 .0856953 
S12 -1.274.786 .5214375 -2.44 0.017 -231.137 -.238203 
_cons .9642168 2.393.923 0.40 0.688 -3.794.745 5.723.178 
/sigma 2.251812 .182467 1.88908 2.614544 
Obs. summary:           4    left-censored observations at Action<=-5 
                          83     uncensored observations 
                        8  right-censored observations at Action>=5 
  Dependent Variable: Punishment/Reward (from –5 for maximal punishment to +5 for maximal reward) 
  Treatment: 0 if Risk, 1 if Baseline; S12: 1 if subject cooperated against a defector, else 0. 
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Figure 3: Emotions and Risk 
 
  Total emotions: Sum of anger, appreciation, disappointment, envy, gratitude, happiness, hate, regret, 
  shame, surprise 
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Instructions 
Instructions for Baseline treatment column players 
Instructions for the Risk treatment/row players and German versions are available from 
the authors upon request. Part 3 and 4 were handed out after part 1 and 2 where completed. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS – Part 1 
 
No talking: Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or communicate any longer 
with each other. If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and 
the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
  
Monetary payments: You may receive monetary payments for participating in this experiment. The 
amount you make will depend on the choices made (as described below). We will randomly select 
four pairs from the class to receive their experiment earnings in Euro. Your earnings will be paid to 
you in cash individually and privately.  
 
Pairing: During parts 1 and 2 of the experiment, you will be paired with one and only one other 
person. However, no participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is paired with. 
Parts 3 and 4 will be done individually. 
 
Roles: In each pair of people, one person will be randomly selected as the "row" player and the other 
will be the "column" player. You will be a column player. 
 
Endowment: At the start of the experiment, you will receive an endowment of $5. 
 
Decision 1: On the DECISION FORM 1 you will see a table of payoffs. The row player will decide 
between Top and Bottom rows, and the column player will decide between the Left and Right 
columns. The intersection of the designated row and column will determine the earnings for each 
person. 
As a column player, you will circle either the Left or the Right column. The row player will circle 
Top or Bottom row. These decisions determine which part of the payoff matrix is relevant (Top Left, 
Top Right, Bottom Left, Bottom Right). In each cell, the row player's payoff is shown first and your 
payoff is shown second (in bold). 
After you have made the decision, we will collect the decision forms and inform you about the 
decision of your paired row player. 
 14
DECISION FORM 1 
 
 Left Right 
Top $8, $8 $0, $10 
Bottom $10, $0 $2, $2 
 
Please circle the Left or Right column. 
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INSTRUCTIONS – Part 2 
Decisions 2: After learning the other player’s decision 1, you can increase or decrease the payoff of 
the other player by assigning points. You can also decide not to change his/her payoff by not assigning 
any points.  
If you decide to increase the other player’s payoff, each point you assign, increases his/her payoff by 
$1. Similarly, if you decide to decrease the other player’s payoff, each point you assign, decreases 
his/her payoff by $1. You can decrease the other player’s payoff only if his/her decision was Bottom. 
The assignment of each point will cost you $1. You can assign at most 5 points. The following table 
illustrates the relation between assigned points and the costs of doing so. 
 
points 0 1 2 3 4 5 
costs of 
these points $0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 
 
The other player can also increase, decrease or leave equal your payoff if they wish to. 
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DECISION FORM 2 
 
Please indicate how many points you want to assign (mark one of the three choices and circle the 
number of points where appropriate). 
 
 
⁭ I want to increase the other player’s payoff by assigning 
1 2 3 4 5 points. 
 
 
⁭ I want to decrease the other player’s payoff by assigning 
1 2 3 4 5 points. 
 
 
⁭ I do not want to change the other player’s payoff.  
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EMOTIONS – Part 3 
 
You will now fill out the emotions questionnaire individually. Those pairs randomly selected for 
payment will receive $8 for filling it out. 
 
Think back at the moment when you learned about your paired player’s decision 1. On a scale 0 to 5 
(with 0 being the least and 5 being the most) mark the following emotions you felt then: 
 
 
(Please circle one number for each emotion) 
 
 
 
• Anger     0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Appreciation    0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Disappointment   0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Envy     0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Gratitude    0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Happiness    0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Hate     0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Regret     0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Shame     0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
• Surprise    0 1 2 3 4 5 
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INSTRUCTIONS – Part 4 
 
We will randomly select 4 another people to be paid for Part 4. The people selected for 
payment for this part will be different than the people selected for the earlier tasks. This is the 
last task and there will be no further tasks after Part 4. 
 
The next page shows ten decision questions. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B."  
 
You will make ten choices and record these in the box to the left of the option. That is, if you 
prefer option A to option B, you will mark an X by option A. Only one of the ten decisions 
will be used in the end to determine your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
A ten-sided die will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the 
"0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your choices, we will throw 
this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to 
determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision 
selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting 
your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each 
decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays $2.00 if the throw of the ten sided 
die is 1, and it pays $1.60 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $3.85 if the throw of the die is 
1, and it pays $0.10 if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you 
move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for 
Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each option pays the highest 
payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.00 or $3.85. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose 
between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other 
rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  
 
To determine the payoffs from this task we will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the 
ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to determine the money earnings 
for the Option you chose for that Decision. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the record sheet. You will have to mark an X in one 
and only one of the boxes in each row, depending whether you prefer option A or option B. 
Then the die throw will determine which of the ten decisions is going to count. We will look 
at the decision that you made for the one that counts, and circle it, before throwing the die 
again to determine your earnings for this part. 
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DECISION FORM 4 
 
 
Option A 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 1/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 9/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 2/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 8/10              OR  
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 3/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 7/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 4/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 6/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 5/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 5/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 6/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 4/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 7/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 3/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 8/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 2/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 9/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 1/10              OR 
 
⁭  $2.00 with probability of 10/10,    
$1.60 with probability of 0/10              OR 
 
 
 
 
Option B 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 1/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 9/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 2/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 8/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 3/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 7/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 4/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 6/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 5/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 5/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 6/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 4/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 7/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 3/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 8/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 2/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 9/10,    
$0.10 with probability of 1/10 
 
⁭  $3.85 with probability of 10/10,   
$0.10 with probability of 0/10 
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QUESTIONS 
 
1.) In what year were you born? 
 
___________________________________ 
 
2.) What is your gender (M/F)? 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
3.) Major: What is your major? 
 
___________________________________ 
 
4.) Which semester are you currently in? 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
5.) Please state the state and country where you were raised. 
 
___________________________________ 
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